The Attribution of Intentionality in Relation to Culture and Self

Gangaw Zaw

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The Attribution of Intentionality in Relation to Culture and Self

by

Gangaw Zaw

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of The requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology

June 2006
Each person whose signature appears below certifies that this dissertation in his/her opinion is adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Attribution of Intentionality in Relation to Culture and Self
by
Gangaw Zaw

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Psychology
Loma Linda University, June 2006
Dr. Hector Betancourt, Chairperson

The attribution of intentionality has received significant attention in the social cognition literature (Malle, 1999). Perceiving the intentions of others has several implications for how individuals judge and respond to others’ behaviors in various social situations. The current study examined factors that predict attributions of intentionality. Studies by Jones and Davis (1965) have indicated the role of culture is involved in perceptions of intentionality. In addition, studies in philosophy have implicated the self as influential in the perception of intentionality. The self is also a product of culture and cultural value orientations (e.g. individualism and collectivism). Markus and Kitayama (1991) identified two construals of the self (e.g. independent and interdependent) that are influenced by culture. The current study examined how cultural value orientations of individualism and collectivism and related beliefs about the self may influence the attribution of intentionality. A Structural Equation model was proposed to explain the hypothesized relations among the variables in a conflict situation. Specifically, it was expected the cultural value orientations would be directly related to the perception intentionality, and indirectly through the construal of the self. The model testing the hypothesized and theoretically based relations among the variables was confirmed, $\chi^2(24, \ldots)$.
The initial results indicated collectivism and individualism influenced the interdependent and independent construal of the self, respectively; however, these variables did not predict the attribution of intentionality. Additional models tested showed that a model incorporating locus of control and controllability improved the fit of the original model, $\chi^2 (69, 224) = 125.03, p = .00$, (CFI) = .95, RMSEA = .06. These results demonstrated that cultural value orientation and the construal of the self indirectly influenced the perception of intentionality through the locus and controllability.
The Attribution of Intentionality in Relation to Culture and Self

Intentionality has received significant attention in the social cognition literature in recent years (Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001). The literature on the study of intentionality extends from attributions of intentionality in violence and aggression (Betancourt & Blair, 1992; Guthrie, 2002), to the development of intentionality within the paradigm of "theory of mind" (Brandstater & Lerner, 1999) and philosophical approaches on intentions and intentionality (Bandura, 2001; Casey & O'Connell, 1999; Malesevic, 2002; Malle, 1999; Sawyer, 2002;). Many studies from developmental and philosophical literatures have considered intentionality to be beliefs that motivate various actions and outcomes by particular individuals. Attribution theorists have studied intentionality in terms of how people perceive intentionality in others' behaviors in various social contexts (Jones & Davis, 1965; Weiner, 1995). The perception of intentionality, defined as the belief that another person's actions are purposeful regardless of outcome, has implications for how people feel, make judgments of blame and responsibility, and deliver punishment to those individuals whose behaviors are perceived as intentional (Weiner, 1995). As the perception of ill intent can lead to various negative outcomes in a multicultural world, it becomes essential to understand how sociocultural and dispositional factors influence the perception of intentionality. One of the aims of the present study is to understand how two factors, cultural orientation (e.g. individualism and collectivism) and dispositional factors (construals of self) may influence the perception of intentionality.
Culture is one factor shown to influence intentionality (Brandstater & Lerner, 1999). Jones and Davis's (1965) *correspondent inference theory* on the attribution of intentionality highlights the importance of social factors that influence the perception of intentionality. The social factors Jones and Davis (1965) discuss concern social desirability, social roles, and prior expectations, all of which are dictated by the rules, norms, and values within a particular sociocultural context. As interest in culture within the field of psychology was not prevalent at the time of Jones and Davis's research, specific aspects of cultural value orientations that may influence intentional thinking were not clarified. In line with the zeitgeist for studying culture in human behavior, it is essential that researchers identify and measure specific aspects of culture that influence psychological processes (Betancourt & Lopez, 1993). The particular cultural variables relevant to the study of intentionality involve individualism and collectivism, two constructs that describe a particular orientation toward either the self or the group (Kemmerling, 2001; Sawyer, 2002). The contributions from the field of philosophy suggest that people socialized in collectivistic or individualistic cultures are likely to experience intentional states differently. In turn, how they perceive the intentionality of others in their group is also likely to be different.

When specific aspects of culture have been identified, some researchers have found cultural values (e.g. individualism and collectivism) have direct and indirect effects on certain behaviors (Gudykunst, Matsumoto, Ting-Toomey, Nishida, Kim, & Heyman, 1996; Singelis & Brown, 1995). One of the indirect factors includes the construal of the self (independent or interdependent) identified by Markus and Kitayama (1991). The individualism construct corresponds to the independent self, whereas the collectivism
construct corresponds to the interdependent self. Typically, the role the self-construal construct plays is an intermediary between cultural value orientation and specific psychological phenomena (e.g. attributions).

When attribution processes were examined in relation to self and culture, the specific processes examined were limited to causal attributions of dispositional versus situational properties (Knowles, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 2001). The attributions of intentionality have not been examined within the domain of self. This may be partly because the self-construal studies stemmed from cultural psychological research, which were a marginalized topic during Jones and Davis’s era. However, on a more intuitive level, another possible reason for the lack of studying these relations between self and intentionality could be that the essence of intentionality itself (regardless of perceiving intentionality or personal desires) already assumes that an agent (the self) is involved. Brandstätter and Lerner (1999), Mascolo, Fischer, and Neimeyer (1999) proposed that any complete understanding of intentionality automatically implicates the self (agency). The purpose of studying the relation between the self and intentionality is essential, given that there are two construals of the self (i.e. independent and interdependent). As there are broad variations in cultural value orientation, variations in the construal of the self, a closer examination of the relations among cultural value orientation, construal of the self, and the attribution of intentionality are necessary to understand interpersonal relationships in a multicultural and interpersonal context.

The central aim of this research is to examine cultural and dispositional factors that influence the attributions of intentionality when a negative social event occurs between two people. This study will directly measure aspects of culture (i.e.
individualism and collectivism) in relation to the attribution of intentionality. Additionally, because culture tends to be a broader factor predicting several psychological outcomes, this study will also measure specific beliefs about the self that are associated with individualism and collectivism, as intermediary factors influencing the attribution of intentionality. To achieve the central aim, this study was designed to answer the following research questions: 1) How do cultural value orientations of collectivism or individualism influence perceptions of intentionality and how strong are the relations between the two constructs, 2) How do individual beliefs about the self as independent or interdependent relate to the individual’s attribution of intentionality, 3) How do individual beliefs about the self as independent or interdependent relate to individualism and collectivism in influencing the individual’s attribution of intentionality? A model including the hypothesized and theory-based relations among cultural value orientation and construal of the self as determinants of the perception of intentionality is proposed (see Figure 1). This model depicts that the perception of intentionality is predicted directly by cultural orientation and indirectly through the beliefs about the self. Thus, the self is expected to mediate the relations between culture and the perception of intentionality.

Figure 1. Hypothesized Model: The influence of culture and beliefs about self on the attribution of intentionality.
The following sections of this paper will first review attribution theory. In general, the significance of studying the attribution of intentionality and how culture is relevant will be discussed. Then it will examine how the elements of individualism and collectivism relate to intentionality. The section following will explore the role of the self-construal in intentionality and the perception of intentionality. It will then summarize how the specific aspects of culture (e.g. individualism and collectivism) affect personal beliefs about the self (e.g. independent and or interdependent) and the attribution of intentionality. Finally, the paper will propose a model describing the relations of culture, self, and perceived intent.

**Attribution Theory and Intentionality**

Historically, the concept of intentionality has been studied by social scientists including philosophers, developmental psychologists, and social psychologists studying attribution theory. While philosophical approaches (Glock, 2001; McGeer & Petit, 2002) and some developmental studies (e.g. Brandstater & Lerner, 1999) on intentionality have focused on the intentionality of individuals' goal directed behaviors, attribution theory has emphasized how individuals perceive the intentionality of others' behaviors. In general, and for the purposes of this paper, the attribution of intentionality is defined by the belief that another person's actions were nonaccidental and purposeful regardless of the outcome of the behavior (Flavell & Miller, 1998). As this current study is concerned with the perception of intentionality in others, this section will review the importance of attribution theory. In particular, the attribution of intentionality and factors that may influence this attribution will be discussed.
Within attribution theory, foundational work by Heider (1958), Jones and Davis (1965), and Weiner (1986) have led to a better understanding of how individuals make sense of and explain their social worlds. These founding fathers of attribution theory believed when negative and unexpected events occurred in the environment, individuals were motivated to search for the causes of these events. Essentially, attribution processes have implications for how one feels and responds to his or her environment (Weiner, 1995). Additionally, how one makes an inference about another's action often plays a role in the social evaluation of blame, responsibility and punishment of the other (Malle, Moses & Baldwin, 2001; Weiner, 1995).

Various attribution processes have been studied in relation to several social psychological domains. The attribution processes such as controllable versus uncontrollable, and locus of control (i.e. situational versus dispositional) have been studied within the domains of interpersonal attraction, achievement motivation, helping behaviors, and aggression (see Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Some studies have even looked at cultural influence on perceiving situational versus dispositional attributions (Knowles et al., 2001; Morris, Menon, Chiu, & Hong, 1999). Typically, collectivism has been found to be associated with situational attributions, while individualism was associated with dispositional attributions.

It appears in Morris et al., 1999, Knowles et al., 2001 that the legacy of Heider (1958) on situational versus dispositional causal attributions, and Weiner's (1995) emphasis on controllability have dominated attribution research within social psychology. One result of the emphasis on the attributions of dispositions and controllability is that studies on the attribution of intentionality have been neglected in social psychological
and attribution research. For instance, Weiner (1995) explained that judgments of responsibility first require a distinction between the person and the situation in terms of causality. After attributing dispositional causality, an assessment of control, is made and if there are no mitigating circumstances, the person is held responsible. Assessing intentionality only becomes important after assessing the degree of responsibility to which the person is held accountable. For Weiner (2001), controllability precedes intentionality and intentionality is a subordinate concept in relation to responsibility. However, Malle (1999) contends that often intentionality is equated with dispositional (internal locus) causality. These two concepts, however, are not the same because dispositional attributions tend to refer to personality traits, and attribution of intentionality refers to the mental structures underlying an action.

Attribution studies on controllability versus uncontrollability, disposition versus situation, while sound and viable, do not address underlying mental structures like perceiving intentionality in others. Both the perception of controllability and locus of control are broad by focusing on the causes of an action, without much consideration for the mental structures underlying that action. This may be because perceiving the underlying intentions of others cannot be as easily recognized in the social environment as much as observing social cues in the environment that cause a person to act (Rosati, Knowles, Kalish, Gobnik, Ames, & Morris, 2001). Individuals may be more likely to evaluate and report causes of events and behaviors to factors that are more observable in the social environment. Whether it may be that lay individuals do not readily report attributions of intentionality, or attribution researchers may not have directly assessed for intentionality, the attributions of intentionality is ignored in attribution research.
Rosati et al. (2001) believe one reason attribution of intentionality has been ignored is that social psychologists lack a shared language about the perceiver's mental representations of others' mental states (i.e. others' intentional states). These authors believe attribution research should delve deeper into understanding the intentionality of others because "reading" each other's minds and understanding the underlying mental states of others occur in everyday interactions. However, when individuals are asked, "why do you think the person to acted in that way", the language used to describe the reason becomes confounded with personality traits or dispositional factors (e.g. he/she was stupid, angry, clumsy, immature, etc.). While these descriptions may indicate internal/dispositional factors, they do not indicate the perception of the underlying mental cause (i.e. intentionality). Perceiving intentionality in others is much different from perceiving dispositional causality. This is because attributing dispositional causes to a person's behavior occurs more readily and does not delve deeply enough into the understanding of the underlying mental state.

When a person is involved in an action, typically assumptions about that individual's dispositions are made. However, these assumptions regarding others dispositional qualities are not sufficient to judge or impose social consequences for their actions. Rather intentionality of the individual's actions plays a role in judgment and imposition of social consequences for the actions.

Casey and O'Connell (1999) demonstrated that the penalties for perpetrators were rated higher when the intentions of the perpetrators were clear. Betancourt and Blair (1992) found that perceiving the intentionality of a perpetrator resulted in a more violent response by the respondent. Betancourt and Guthrie (2000) revealed that third and sixth
grade children responded in more competitive ways with an instigator when an instigator’s behavior was perceived to be intentional. It seems when the individuals are directly asked about the intentions of others, it becomes apparent that the attribution of intentionality in others’ behaviors is evaluated. This evaluation of intentionality in turn influences how individuals respond. Human social interactions are rich with perceiving intentionality of others’ actions, partly because perceiving intentionality in others brings order and structure for the perceivers to make sense of and explain the complex stream of human behaviors, and direct us in how to respond based on the beliefs about others’ mental states (Malle et. al., 2001).

Even though studies on intentions and intentionality have been limited in attribution research, they are not entirely new to the field. Jones and Davis’s (1965) early work on correspondent inference theory held the assumption that when making inferences about people, the behavior of the other person will be most informative when judged to be intentional (i.e. if the person believed the action was produced by a consistent underlying intention). One main contribution of these authors was that inferring intentionality precedes the perception of dispositional or situational attributions (Rosati et al., 2001). Jones and Davis (1965) believed there was a process individuals experienced before they attributed a dispositional cause to somebody’s behaviors.

The process Jones and Davis referred to involves the analysis of “noncommon effects,” that is, when social perceivers realize there is more than one course of action an actor can take, perceivers ask what the individual got out of doing a specific behavior rather than an alternative behavior. In other words, what was the distinctive consequence of an actor’s chosen course of action? Jones and Davis also contended that individuals
rely on other social cues before inferring dispositional or situational causation because evaluations of the "noncommon effects" produce ambiguous conclusions about the underlying mental state. The other social factors relied on before inferring dispositional or situational causation included choice, social desirability, social role, and prior expectations. Jones and Davis believed that behaviors perceived as undesirable violate social roles (norms), and prior expectations lead perceivers to conclude an intention underlying a behavior. These authors further contended that perceiving dispositional attributions immediately followed this perception of intent. Additionally, dispositions were also assumed when the behavior was out of the actor's usual social role and the behavior violated prior expectations. According to Jones and Davis (1965), intentionality automatically assumed dispositions of the person, and in the course of their work, they eventually equated intentionality with dispositional attributions. However, the most important aspect of their theory was that these social cues were used to infer the underlying intentions of the other before attributions of locus of control and controllability were assessed.

Hence, it seems there are two theoretical links in how attribution processes of locus of control, controllability and intentionality function. Whereas Weiner's (1995) formulation of how attribution processes function in relation to intentionality would be:

Social event → disposition or situation attribution → controllable or uncontrollable → judgment of responsibility → judgments of intentionality, Jones and Davis's formulation would be: Social event → attention to the social context → intentionality → disposition or situation attribution → controlled or uncontrolled → judgment of responsibility. Jones and Davis's formulation takes into
account the importance of the social context. Even though they considered the importan
tce of the social context, they did not specify what behaviors were considered socially undesirable in a given socio-cultural context, which defined rules for desirable and undesirable social behaviors (e.g. conflict). For example, there are variations in how collectivist and individualist cultures view conflict (Hofstede, 2001). Collectivist cultures consider conflict as something undesirable and something to be avoided, whereas individualist cultures tend to view conflict as a situation to re-negotiate current relationships (Itoi, Ohbuchi, Fukuno, 1996; Pearson & Stephan, 1998). If the social values of collectivist cultures involve viewing conflict as undesirable, there may also be a difference in how cultural value orientations affect attributions of intentionality.

To summarize, current attribution research mainly has focused on attribution processes that concern disposition versus situational causes, controlled and uncontrolled causes. In effect, attribution theory has neglected the importance of the perception of intentionality in social cognition research. The role intentionality has been given in attribution research is subordinate. Perceptions of intentionality have often been considered interchangeable with the perception of dispositional causes. The perception of intentionality, however, should not be ignored because everyday interactions with others are comprised of trying to understand the causes of each others behaviors and the course of action one should take in response to others’ behaviors. Even in court settings and violent situations, knowing the individual intended to do harm results in more severe negative social responses and negative consequences for opponents. Although intentionality has virtually taken a back seat in attribution research, earlier researchers such as Jones and Davis (1965) have placed the perception of intentionality as preceding
the attribution of dispositional causes. Their theory calls attention to the fact that social perceivers are more likely to infer intentionality based on the social cues in their environment than make a judgment about dispositional causes. They believe the social cues perceivers rely on, included the social desirability of the behavior, the consistency with the social role, and prior expectations of the actor's behaviors. These cues inform the perceivers' knowledge of the actor's underlying mental state (intentionality).

The importance of Jones and Davis's (1965) explanations of intentionality is that it takes into account the reality of the socio-cultural context in which individuals are embedded. These authors' discussions on social desirability, social roles, and prior expectations direct the current research to understand what the mechanisms are that inform individuals about the appropriate social roles, norms and behaviors in specific socio-cultural settings. What is considered socially desirable and appropriate in one socio-cultural context is not necessarily the same in another context (for reviews, see Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 1994; Kim, 1994). Culture, as the individual's context, then becomes relevant to how one perceives intentionality in others.

Culture is the mechanism by which individuals are taught and socialized about the rules, norms, values, and ideals about appropriate human behaviors (Betancourt & Lopez, 1993; Markus & Kitayama, 1994). Often individuals are expected to internalize a cultural value, which in turn has implications for how they feel, think, and behave (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Commonly culture dictates values about conflict, and responses to conflict. Yet despite cultural variations, researchers often equate culture with race and ethnicity, which does not explain what aspects of culture influence the psychological phenomena of interest. This study seeks to determine the specific aspects
of culture (e.g. collectivism and individualism) associated with the perception of intentionality. Before proposing the important aspects of culture for the perception of intentionality, a brief review of how this construct has been considered in other disciplines will be provided. The concept of intentionality has various meanings and implications in social psychology and philosophy.

**Intentionality: Definitions and Implications**

The conceptualization of intentionality is an elusive concept to study. In philosophy and in psychology the concept of intentionality is often intertwined with the notion of agency and self (Bandura, 2001; Brandstätter & Lerner, 1999; Glock, 2001). When psychological research is conducted on intentionality and agency, research focuses on self-efficacy and motivation, which reflects the extent to which one has control to bring about an intention or desire through personal action (Bandura, 2001). The current study is not concerned with self-efficacy issues. The concentration here involves attributions of intentionality, trying to understand how people make sense of and understand the underlying mental structures of others.

*Definitions of intentionality: Social psychological (attribution) perspective.*

Social cognition and attribution researchers have extended the concept of intentionality from within the person to outside the person and defined intentionality as the inference of whether or not the underlying mental processes of desire and beliefs were present in the others' behaviors (Mascolo et al., 2001). For another person's behavior to be perceived as intentional, Malle (1999) believed the actor must have (a) a desire for an outcome, (b) beliefs about a behavior leading to that outcome, (c) a resulting intention to perform that behavior, (d) the skill to perform the behavior, and (e) awareness of fulfilling the
intention while performing the behavior. All of these conditions for judging behavior as intentional may be relevant and considered in court settings in passing judgment and sentencing. However, in everyday social encounters, perception of intentionality has a more general meaning, which is the belief that a person's offensive behavior was done purposefully (Betancourt & Blair, 1992). Flavell and Miller's (1998) definition of intent involves two components: (a) nonaccidental behavior that is related to desires but differentiated from outcomes, and (b) a prior mental state of planning an action and believing one will carry it out. For the current study, the perception of intentionality will be operationalized as the belief that another person's negative social behavior is construed as nonaccidental and purposeful, regardless of the outcome.

Definition of intentionality: Philosophical perspective. Intentionality has been conceptualized in philosophy "as the directedness of the mind towards a content or object" (Glock, 2001, p. 105). Philosophical work on intentionality has been devoted to analyzing the conceptual components of intentional action or the beliefs and desires of the individual that guide action (Malle, et al., 2001). The philosophical stance on intentionality holds that human beings are minded in a distinctively self-regulating, purposeful way that shows up in a broad range of activities driven by a variety of personal goals and desires (McGeer & Petit, 2002). McGeer and Petit (2002) described intentions as a mediator between desires and actions. For instance, desires may create an intention for a person to move toward an attractive object, disgust may create an intention to move away from an object. Additionally, "intentionality is the property of actions that makes ordinary people and scholars alike call them purposeful, meant, or done intentionally" (Malle et al. 2001, p. 3). When intentionality is attributed to another
individual, an assumption of the actions is that they are perceived to have an underlying mental structure that makes the behavior purposeful, meant, and done intentionally.

Although a social psychologist, Bandura's reflections on intentionality seem more in line with philosophical views on intentions. Bandura (2001) suggested that an intention is a representation of a future course of action to be performed, with a proactive commitment to bringing it about. It is the exercise of agency to control a course of action to achieve a particular desire and goal. Bandura (2001) believed that agency (the self) referred to any acts done intentionally. In his conceptualization of intentions, the self influences intentions and intentionality, in that personal desires and needs (which create an intention to move toward or away from an object) identify the self. This is an assumption made by many social science researchers. However, this assumption needs to be investigated further because the idea of self is no longer restricted to an autonomous individual. It seems that current researchers in psychology (Bandura, 2001; Markus & Kitayama, 1994) and philosophy (Sawyer, 2002; Tollesefen, 2002) are beginning to value the notion of "collective agency," "collective mindset," "collectivism," and "interdependent self." As such, it becomes important to understand intentionality not only from the perspective of personal agency, but also collective agency. How do individuals with "collectivist selves" affect the attribution of intentionality in other people? It is likely that if a person's belief about the self no longer implied an autonomous agent, intentionality and intentional actions within the individual would be different.

As assumed in previous studies (Bandura, 2001; Malle, 1999), the self influences intentionality. However, if the self was not just an autonomous agent, but also a collective agent, it is likely that a person's intentional action would be affected. For
example, if a person was raised to attend to their own needs and desires, and to value being an autonomous agent, their awareness and concern for other people’s needs and desires may not be as salient as someone that was socialized to attend to the needs of others. If individuals were socialized differently in how they perceive their own personal needs, desires and intentional states, their perceptions of intentionality in others would also be different. Specifically, if they were socialized to attend to the personal needs and desires of others, they may be more likely to see intentionality in others. Hence this study asks what factors might affect both the variations in perceptions of self and the perception of intentionality. One variable this study proposes is culture. Jones and Davis (1965) highlighted the importance of the sociocultural context in inferring intentionality, and Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed that culture influenced the construal of the self. When studying culture, it is important to identify what about culture is thought to influence the psychological processes of interest (Betancourt & Lopez, 1993). Therefore, it is important to identify specific cultural value orientations that may influence construal of the self as well as the perception of intentionality.

*Individual and collective mind.* In philosophy, individualism has been discussed in terms of trying to determine if intentionality is entirely an “individualistic” concept (Glock, 2001). Within the philosophical discipline, it is taken for granted that the individual mind is real and intentional. However, what the philosophers have wrestled with is whether the collective social entity is real and capable of an intentional mind. As a consequence, contemporary philosophers denied the possibility that the collective (social) phenomena were real and could exert any causal power. The view that the collective
mind exists independent of particular individual mental states has been dismissed by most as absurd, dogmatic, unscientific, and even mystical (Tollefsen, 2002).

The denial of the collective mind as a real entity with some causal powers has not been dismissed entirely (Kemmerling, 2001; Sawyer, 2002; Tollefsen, 2002). Tollefsen (2002) makes several philosophical arguments regarding how the attributions of intentionality toward groups are not only real but also provide us with a rich explanatory resource. She claims that individuals attributing intentionality to groups is not merely metaphorical, since there is a complex practice of attributing moral and legal responsibility to groups, and the social legal sanctions that groups incur are not merely metaphorical. The consequences that these groups face are very real in terms of social, economic, and political effects (Tollefsen, 2002). According to Tollefsen (2002), because specific social groups endure real political, social, and economic consequences, a collective mind with its own intentions and goals does exist independent of the individual mind.

In sum, philosophical research has proposed the reality of a collective mind that is capable of having its own collective intentions and actions, irreducible to individual intentions and actions. In other words, intentionality is no longer considered an individualistic concept. We must consider the existence of a group mind that possesses its own desires and intentions and capable of acting according to the wishes of the group. Extending the idea of collective intentionality and individual intentionality to social psychological research, Bandura (2001) described the influence of collective efficacy on group effort and how this collective efficacy phenomenon functions similarly to his earlier discussions on self-efficacy. The current study, however, is not concerned with
collective efficacy and collective effort because these concepts tend to focus
intentionality within the individual (or within the group). The current study is concerned
with how the sense of collective agency or personal agency is shaped by culture.
Additionally, it is concerned with the specific cultural value orientations that may affect
the attribution of intentionality in others as well as the sense of personal or collective
agency.

Philosophical discussions on individualism and collectivism allude to cultural
constructs of individualism and collectivism in understanding perceptions of
intentionality. Early cultural psychologists' (e.g. Triandis et al., 1986; Hofstede, 1980)
descriptions on the value orientations of individualism and collectivism already discussed
differences in cultures between the East and West. Hofstede (1980) found in general,
Eastern cultures valued the goals of the collective, whereas Western cultures valued the
goals of the self. Psychology has not directly paired these cultural constructs with
intentionality.

The current paper argues that if individuals are socialized differently to value
either the self or the group goals and intentions, it is likely that how they think, feel, and
perceive themselves as well as others' intentions and behaviors also will be different.
Recall that Jones and Davis's (1965) research on intentionality suggested that the
sociocultural environment influences the perception of intentionality through the
perceiver's evaluation of the actor's behavior. The evaluation centers on whether the
behavior is socially desirable, violating social roles or prior expectations. Before
explaining the ways in which intentionality is thought to relate to each cultural construct,
a more thorough discussion on culture and cultural orientations of individualism and collectivism is warranted.

The Study of Culture

The study of culture in psychology needs elaboration because culture has typically inappropriately been equated with ethnicity and race. Betancourt and Lopez (1993) defined culture as the human-made part of the environment. They indicated subjective culture referred to the social roles, communication patterns, affective styles, and values for individualism or collectivism that were internalized within the individual (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Hence these internalized cultural value orientations can be amenable to measurement. Moreover, the specific elements of culture (e.g. roles and values) can be directly assessed (Betancourt & Lopez, 1993), and must be assessed in order to understand exactly what specific aspect of culture influences the individual's behavior. Several studies directly measured cultural value orientations and found them to influence a variety of behaviors, including conflict resolution styles and health-related behaviors (Pearson & Stephan, 1998; Zaw, 2002; McMillin, 2003; Betancourt, Hardin, & Manzi, 1992).

Individualism and collectivism. One of the most common cultural dimensions used by cultural researchers has been the individualism and collectivism constructs. Societies in Western Europe and the United States have been found to be individualistic while societies such as those in Asia and Latin America have been associated with being more collectivistic (Triandis, et al., 1993). The social, ecological and political milieu of each society is very different. The antecedents for collectivist societies stemmed from resource scarcity, presence of large families, and agricultural activities that required
cooperation (Triandis et al., 1993). Some features of the collectivistic construct include conformity, interdependence within a group, sacrificing individual goals for the collective good and maintaining social harmony. There is also acceptance of authority from the homogeneous “in-groups” (Triandis et al., 1993). In-groups can be defined as “sets of individuals with whom a person feels similar” (Triandis, 1994, p. 43). These groups of individuals are bound together by a common fate or another attribute. In collectivist cultures, in-groups are ascribed, strictly bound by kinship, tribe, religion, village, and or nation (Triandis, 1994). Collectivist societies are considered cultures of relatedness where there is a strong maintenance of cohesive in-groups (Kim, 1994). Collectivism perpetuates in-group favoritism and ethnocentrism. The most important distinction about an individual reared in collectivist society is whether the individual is part of the in-group or not. Collectivist societies have firm group boundaries. An internal structure of this society can be described by the “relational mode,” exemplified by the fluid boundaries among individuals that allow thoughts, ideas, and emotions to flow freely. There is an unspoken understanding of what others in their group need, feel, and think without it being stated openly. Individuals are generally socialized to be interdependent with one another.

The characteristics of an individualistic society are converse to these collectivist themes. The discriminating factor of individualism is separation from the in-group (Triandis, et al., 1986). Individuals are not bound to an in-group by kinship, religion or village. In individualist cultures, in-group membership is achieved. Individuals are bound together by similar beliefs, attitudes, values, action programs, and occupation rather than by kinship or race (Triandis, 1994). Individualists have been socialized to be
autonomous and to care for their own needs. In this society, a firm boundary separates the individual from others and the environment. The emotional ties to any one group are usually temporary because the relationships tend to be contractual—because beliefs, attitudes, and occupations can shift. A common feature of the individualist society involves more independence from family, relatives, and others. Individuals within individualistic cultures are encouraged to express their needs without a concern to save the face of their opponent in order to satisfy their own needs. However, there is greater concern to save one's own face in an individualistic society to protect the bounded self in comparison to collectivistic societies. (Ting-Toomey et al., 1991).

To summarize, the collectivist value orientation corresponds with sustaining group harmony, loyalty to the in-group, respect for authority, and the downplaying of one's own needs in order to prioritize the needs of the group. The individualist value orientation corresponds with prioritizing individual needs, directly expressing these personal needs, and less focus and dependence on others in their culture. As these values are socialized within the individual, there are various implications for what people feel, think, and believe about the self.

In the case of the perception of intentionality, the internalization of these cultural value orientations are expected to show a marked difference in how one perceives intent in others' behaviors. In particular, it is likely that collectivism may be more likely to relate to attributions of intentionality than individualism. One reason is because collectivism places a high value on group harmony and any kind of conflict is unexpected, considered to be negative and undesirable; therefore, blame is assigned to the individual. Recall that Jones and Davis (1965) theorized that socially undesirable
behaviors tend to be more salient to perceivers. From a collectivist perspective, the person creating the conflict is behaving in an undesirable manner by violating social norms. If the instigator is an out-group member, less prior knowledge of that person is available, and therefore, collectivists may be more likely to assume intent underlying the other person's behavior.

Moreover, the collectivist social structure demands more conformity with the group's ideals, needs, and goals. Individuals are not only more likely to be in tune with their social environment (the social collective mind), but also more invested as in-group members to achieve the goals of the group. In this situation, there is less room for individual behaviors to deviate from the goals of the group. In the collectivist social structure, behaviors are considered to deviate from the group, especially when a person expresses and prioritizes personal needs above the needs of others in the group, which creates conflict (Triandis, 1994). These individualistic types of behaviors are considered socially undesirable and violate the expectations of the other person's social roles within the particular collectivist social context. As Jones and Davis (1965) suggested, when social behaviors are judged to be undesirable, out of context, and violate social norms, individuals become more aware of the intentions of the actor and make more dispositional attributions. In this case, a person with a collectivist value orientation may be more likely to assume others share similar goals and expectations with him or her (i.e. others have "good intentions for them"). When the other's behaviors suggest otherwise, the expectations are violated and intentionality is more likely to be ascribed.

Zaw (2002) demonstrated that cultural value orientation affects the perception of intentionality in a conflict situation. Her study measured individualism and collectivism,
the attribution processes of controllability and intentionality in relation to conflict resolution preferences. It was found that collectivism was related to the perception of intentionality, whereas individualism was related to controllability. Additionally, collectivism influenced a dominating style of resolution indirectly through the perception of intentionality. One explanation given was that the values socialized within collectivist cultures (i.e. attention to others' needs and goals) influenced how the individual perceived the underlying mental state leading to the instigators' actions. Therefore, the current study will examine how collectivism specifically relates to the attribution of intentionality.

The complexity of the individualism and collectivism construct. Although the cultural constructs of individualism and collectivism seem simple, in reality, they are complex. It is important to note that individualism and collectivism are not opposite ends of the same dimension (Triandis, 1994). Instead each construct is uni-dimensional and can coexist. Higher levels of individualism do not necessarily imply lower levels of collectivism (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Even though it may sound contradictory, individualism can be exhibited in a collectivist culture and vice versa. For example, within an individualist culture (e.g. U.S), a person may be higher on collectivism with his family and may be more individualistic at work. Due to the within cultural variations on the two constructs, Triandis and colleagues (1993) used different terminology to describe cultural variations at the individual level. Corresponding to collectivism is allocentrism, in that there is a personal tendency to define oneself in relation to others. Allocentrists are more likely to downplay personal goals and emphasize the goals of the collective. Corresponding with individualism is idiocentrism,
the tendency to define oneself through self-attributes. Other terms used interchangeably with allocentrism and idiocentrism are interdependent self-construal and the independent self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). As this study is concerned with the self as another predictor of the attribution of intentionality, the interdependent and independent construal of self will be assessed in relation to the cultural value orientation of individualism and collectivism.

Although the individualism and collectivism constructs have been used commonly in cultural research, researchers have discussed problems with culture's direct influence on individual behaviors and cognitions (Kashima, 1989; Gudykunst et al., 1996). Several authors (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Fiske, 2002; Kitayama, 2002; Gudykunst, et al., 1996) have argued that studying cultural dimensions alone may not be sufficient to predict certain behaviors. Further, they have provided two main arguments. The first argument researchers have made is that broad cultural level tendencies alone should not be used to predict individual level behaviors (Triandis, 1994; Gudykunst et al., 1996). While it is essential to identify the specific aspect of the cultural value orientation that differentiates psychological and behavioral processes, cultural value orientation is not an individual trait. Fiske (2002) believed measuring individual differences as if culture were a personality dimension (e.g. individualism and collectivism) was problematic. This is because culture is a process by which individuals implicitly engage in accepted social practices that may not always be in the realm of explicit awareness (Kitayama, 2002). A meta-analytic review on individualism and collectivism (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002) noted that current approaches in directly measuring individualism and collectivism assume the cultural frame is a form of
declarative knowledge, something that respondents can report on rather than a set of subtle and implicit practices. Subtle and implicit practices are not something respondents can report on because these practices are deeply woven into everyday life and a part of normal living. Nevertheless, because it is difficult to measure these subtle implicit practices, paper and pencil assessment of individualism and collectivism serve as a proxy for the cultural orientation the person has internalized. Measuring the cultural value orientation only represents the broader construct of the individual’s cultural preference. It does not take into consideration the proximal individual factors that serve as intermediaries (e.g. construal of the self) between cultural value orientation and specific behaviors (Gudykunst et al., 1996).

The second argument why identifying culture or cultural orientation alone is not sufficient is due to changes in cultural practices of various nations. Globalization is the current state of the world while demographics and culture are rapidly changing. Neglecting the rapid changes of culture tends to be problematic. In a time where globalization has collapsed local cultures into parts of broader global cultures, the intensity of the connections among various cultures and world regions has accelerated dramatically. The influence of globalization is not just limited to increases in economic and ecological areas of life worldwide, it has pervaded into changes in local cultures, family structures and psychological processes (e.g. ethnic identity, self concept, see Arnett, 2002).

In the age of globalization, the implicit rules of culture are changing considerably, especially in countries such as China and Japan. Arnett (2002) cited that within the last two decades, these two societies, traditionally collectivistic, have been influenced by
economic changes and increased contact with the West. Consequently values have become considerably more individualistic. Arnett (2002) further contended that even the self-concept and social identities of individuals from once traditional rural cultures are changing to adapt to globalized cultures and to adopt a global identity.

To further illustrate the effects of globalization, the meta-analytic study by Oyserman, et al. (2002) revealed that certain aspects of individualism and collectivism do not necessarily distinguish Japanese, Chinese, or Korean from American. For instance, the authors found certain facets of collectivism such as seeking advice from others or a sense of belonging did not differentiate U.S. and Hong Kong students in levels of collectivism. Only aspects of collectivism such as group harmony and duty to the group showed Americans to be lower on collectivism. Individualism also functioned in a similar way, showing that the difference between North American and Japanese levels of individualism depends on a combination of values for independence, personal uniqueness, personal privacy, and direct communication, but not necessarily for competitiveness. The implications of these findings are that globalization has blurred the once clear boundaries of nations distinguished by value orientations of individualism and collectivism.

To summarize, there are complexities in the cultural constructs of individualism and collectivism. These complexities involve the within cultural variations in specific cultural values (e.g. individualism and collectivism). Essentially, collectivism can coexist within an individualist society and vice versa. Moreover, researchers (Kashima, 1989; Gudykunst et al., 1996) claimed the individualism and collectivism constructs are too broad and heterogeneous to explain differences in social behaviors. Additionally, the
effects of globalization have blurred the once clear boundaries of specific nations, cultural practices, values, and beliefs. Thus, due to the complexities, it is important that more proximal, personal/dispositional variables be included in the understanding of social cognition such as attribution processes of intentionality. As stated earlier, the purpose of this study is to understand cultural and personal factors that influence the attribution of intentionality. To this end, identifying the specific cultural value orientations in addition to variations in types of selves that can exist becomes critical. The individual level factors associated with the individualism and collectivism constructs are Markus and Kitayama's (1991; 1994) conceptualization of the construal of the self, because the self is also relevant to studies on intentionality.

Culture and Self

Various authors have discussed the role of culture and its effects on the beliefs about the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman & Markus, 1993; Singelis & Brown, 1995). These authors contend that culture constitutes the core ideas and values reflected in key ideological and philosophical texts and institutions. These ideologies are implicitly and explicitly transmitted through socialization practices that include any social interaction between individuals. As a result of efforts to respond to or adjust to the set of norms established by a particular culture, a set of personalized habitual psychological tendencies such as the beliefs about the self develop (Markus & Kitayama, 1994).

Markus and Kitayama's (1991; 1994) studies on independence and interdependence have been influential in understanding how culture shapes beliefs about the self. First they described that the collective reality or core cultural ideals within a
culture include the values and their related ecological, historical, economic, and sociopolitical factors. Various nations are rich with their own histories and political inclinations and have developed different ideals within their own cultures. Whereas the U.S. ideals place emphasis on the "natural rights" of individuals, Japan and other Asian countries place a high value on the "social person." These cultural ideals and moral imperatives of a given cultural group are transmitted by a diverse set of customs, norms, scripts, practices and institutions that carry out the collective reality into a psychological reality. These norms of culture are powerful in shaping behaviors. These norms and practices become a lived experience in an individual's local world (e.g. home, school, restaurants, etc). Quite unknowingly, they live out the core cultural values and strive to achieve the cultural ideals. This lived experience leads to a set of habitual psychological tendencies—"particular, proceduralized ways of thinking, feeling, striving, knowing, understanding, deciding, managing, adjusting, adapting, which are in some large part structured, reinforced, and maintained by the constraints and affordances of the particular social episodes of the individual's local worlds," (Markus & Kitayama, 1994, p. 573).

Self-construals play a major role in regulating various psychological processes (e.g. cognition, emotion, and motivation). Understanding the differences in construals has implications for how the precise role of the self mediates and regulates behavior (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). For example, Markus and Kitayama (1991) indicate that the interdependent and independent self has consequences for (a) attentiveness and sensitivity to others, and a greater cognitive elaboration of the other or of the self-in-relation-to other, (b) knowledge about the person (either self or other) as not abstract and generalized across contexts, but instead specific to the focal context. If there are
variations in how the construal of the self influences psychological processes as well as behaviors, the perception of intentionality may be also influenced by variations in the construal of the self.

**Independent self-construal.** Consider a person brought up in U.S. or another Western culture. Formal institutions in the U.S. typically promote independence, self-reliance, and self-confidence. Through daily interactions with parents, teachers, or other institutions, persons raised in this culture will come to believe and experience themselves as autonomous, decontextualized, and a bounded self, distinct from other members of the collective. The expectations for individuals raised in these cultures involve becoming independent from others and discovering and expressing one's unique attributes (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Achieving the cultural ideal of independence requires construing oneself as an individual whose behavior is made meaningful by reference to one's own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and actions, rather than by reference to the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others. When thinking about themselves, individuals with a highly developed independent view of the self will have as a referent their own abilities, attributes, characteristics, or goals versus the needs or desire of others. When thinking about others, they will consider the other's personal characteristics and attributes versus relational or contextual factors (Singelis, 1994). Moreover, individuals with independent self-construals living in an individualistic culture are likely to assume others strive for the same cultural ideal of independence and will deal with others accordingly.

**Interdependent self-construal.** Individuals reared in a culture with core interdependent ideals will come to believe and experience themselves as an integral part of a context or situation in which the self is connected, fitted, and assimilated with others
and the context (Markus & Kitayama 1991). The interdependent construal presumes the fundamental connectedness of human beings to each other. Interdependence entails seeing oneself as part of an encompassing social relationship and recognizing that one’s behavior is contingent on and to a large extent organized by what the actor perceives to be the thoughts, feelings, needs, and actions of others in the relationship. This view of the self as interdependent features the individual as less differentiated from others. People are motivated to fit in with others, fulfill and create obligations, and become a part of various interpersonal relationships. Although these relationships are critical, the interdependent self cannot be properly characterized as a bounded whole, because the structure of the social context changes. As each social context changes, the self can blend into the environment. The uniqueness of such a self comes from the specific nature of the relationships each person has developed. What is critical and objectified in an interdependent self is not the inner self or internal attributes (e.g. abilities, opinions, judgments, and personality characteristics), but the relationships of the person with other actors (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), specific to situations the individual is in. Internal attributes of the person are considered to be elusive and unreliable in every context or situation. Markus and Kitayama, (1991) stated:

In many domains of social life, one’s opinions, abilities, and characteristics are assigned secondary roles—they must instead be constantly controlled and regulated to come to terms with the primary task of interdependence. Such voluntary control of the inner attributes constitutes the core of the cultural ideal of becoming mature. (p. 227)
According to these authors, the internal needs and desires of the individual are placed secondary to the needs of the collective, and maturity is how well the individual adapts and blends into the social environment. In order for individuals to successfully achieve this ideal sense of the interdependent self, they must be attentive to the collective goals and collective mind (Tollesefen, 2002) and have a better sense of collective agency (Bandura, 2001).

The idea of collective agency and conforming to the demands of the collective agency is considered absurd and mystical to some, as Tollesefen (2002) mentioned. In Western cultures such as the United States, the sense of self being interdependent with others often carries negative connotations such as *enmeshment, dependent, and having weak ego strength* (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Markus and Kitayama (1991), however, stated that, although the individual is considered to be a part of the context and less differentiated from others, the interdependent view of the self does not result in a merging of self and other. Nor does it imply that one must always be in the company of others to function effectively. It also does not imply that people do not have a sense of themselves as agents who are the origins of their own actions, or that agents do not have a sense of personal control. Markus and Kitayama (1991) contended:

It takes a higher degree of self-control and agency to effectively adjust oneself to various interpersonal contingencies. Agentic exercise of control, however, is directed primarily to the inside and to those inner attributes, such as desires, personal goals, and private emotions that can disturb the harmonious equilibrium of interpersonal transaction. This can be contrasted with the Western notion of control, which primarily implies an assertion of the inner attributes and a
consequent attempt to change the outer aspects, such as one's public behaviors and the social situations. (p. 228)

Thus, according to Markus and Kitayama (1991), the personal sense of self is not entirely meshed into the demands of the group. They stated that being able to adapt to various social situations not only requires a higher sense of personal agency, the direction personal agency takes is controlling the self desires, goals and intentions, not controlling the environment to fulfill personal desires, goals, and intentions. According to Markus and Kitayama (1991), relationships for interdependent individuals are an end in and of itself, versus a means to an end. Maintaining a connection with others means being constantly aware of others' needs, desires, goals, and intentions. The basic assumption among interdependent individuals is that, while promoting the goals of others, the person with whom one is interdependent attends to the person's own goals.

It is important to remember that interdependent individuals only exercise these cooperative actions when there is a reasonable assurance of the "good intentions" of others, namely that the other also shares a commitment to engage in a reciprocal interaction and mutual support (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). These "good intentions" of the other may not be readily recognized when the other behaves out of context, creates tension, and disrupts the social situation by creating a conflict situation. For example, imagine an interpersonal conflict situation in which an interdependent individual is affronted. Generally, the interdependent person is more sensitive and knowledgeable about the context and the needs of the other and therefore is careful not to offend others. When affronted, however, the offensive behavior of the other creates tension, and disrupts the social harmony. The good intentions of the other become questionable.
because the negative behavior is out of context and violates prior expectations of the other person. As Jones and Davis (1965) suggested, negative actions of others highlight the dispositions of the actor. Markus and Kitayama (1991) suggest that for interdependent individuals, it is not only the dispositions that are salient; also the underlying intentions of the actor become more salient. This may be because the interdependent individual may be more sensitive to the need and desire that underlie the offensive behavior.

To summarize, Markus and Kitayama's (1991; 1994) research identifies two different kinds of selves. Essentially, cultural values of individualism and collectivism affect perceptions of the self. In particular, the collectivist value orientation promotes the self-construal of interdependence with others and has a stronger adherence to the sense of collective agency. If two kinds of selves exist (independent and interdependent), how might the concept of intentionality be affected? More importantly, because the current study is concerned about the perception of intentionality in others' behaviors, how does the independent and interdependent construal of the self influence the perception of intentionality?

So far the current review has postulated that the perception of intentionality is directly influenced by culture (i.e. cultural value orientation of individualism and collectivism). Culture also directly influences the perceptions of self. Moreover, the construals of the self have been shown to play an intermediary role between cultural constructs of individualism and various other psychological processes (Gudykunst et al., 1996). The direct relationship from self to perceptions of intentionality has not been clear-cut. To achieve the aim of the current research of understanding the relations among cultural value orientation, construal of the self, and perceptions of intentionality,
the next section will briefly discuss the relations between self and perception of
intentionality.

**Self and Attribution of Intentionality**

There is minimal research on the direct relations between self and intentionality. As previously mentioned, one reason for the lack of research may be that the study of intentionality on an intuitive level implies a person, a self, an agency is already involved (Malle, 1999). We cannot infer intentionality when there are no persons involved (Jones & Davis, 1965). As Jones and Davis (1965) propose, the attribution of intentionality is indispensable to dispositional attributions. Other researchers (Brandstädter & Lerner, 1999; Mascolo, et al., 1999) believe the study of intentionality and agency is central to any coherent conception of the self. Mascolo et al. (1999) described intentional agency (the person) as guided by a particular vision of the self in order to aspire to an ideal sense of self no matter what that self may be. Typically, research on self and intentionality has focused on the concepts of self-efficacy and motivation. These studies on self and intentionality tend to focus on the individual but not on interpersonal relationships. In addition, the studies on self and intentionality typically assume the self is a bounded independent self, capable and in control of his or her own actions.

The current study, however, recognizes there are two different kinds of ideal selves that exist: Independent and interdependent. Thus, a closer look at the relations between self and intentionality is required. This current study, however, is not interested in understanding how having a sense of interdependence lead to a sense of collective efficacy and how the group goes about accomplishing a goal. The purpose of this study is to understand how the construal of the self as independent or interdependent shapes the
attribution of intentionality of others in a social situation. The author believes that because cultural constructs of individualism influences the independent self, collectivism influences the interdependent self, and culture also influences perception of intentionality, the self must play an intermediary role between these two constructs.

Summary: Culture, Self and Attribution of Intentionality

Recently, intentionality has been given a significant amount of attention in social cognition research. The perception of intentionality is essential in everyday aspects of human society. It not only determines the individual's subsequent feelings of anger and responses, but also how individuals make judgments of responsibility in crime and punishment (Betancourt & Blair, 1992; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Weiner, 1995). Typically, the study of intentionality falls under the discipline of social psychology, specifically the domain of attribution theory. Attribution theory refers to how individuals find causes to events in their environment in order to make sense of their world. The foundational works by Heider (1958), Weiner (1995), and Jones and Davis (1965) have led the way in understanding how individuals perceive dispositional versus situational and controllable versus uncontrollable causes. Research studies in attribution theory have neglected the study of the attribution of intentionality. This is partly because over the course of Heider's work, attribution of intentionality became conflated with dispositional attributions, and the importance of intentionality never gained momentum until recently (Maile, 1999). Although Jones and Davis (1965) equated attributions of disposition with attributions of intentionality, their correspondent inference theory suggested perceivers paid close attention to cues in their sociocultural context in order to infer the mental state of the other (i.e. intentions). The cues in the environment to which individuals pay
attention are conditioned by the larger, cultural values and practices. Therefore, it is important to understand how cultural values might influence the perception of intentionality.

To specify what is meant by the perception of intentionality, the current study define the perception of intentionality as the belief that another person’s negative social behavior is construed as non-accidental and purposeful, regardless of the outcome. This conceptualization of intentionality differs markedly from philosophical conceptions in that philosophy considers intentionality indispensable to agency and the self. However, as recent researchers have indicated (Bandura, 2001; Tollefesen, 2002), the idea of agency can no longer be restricted to individual agency or the self. Bandura (2001) discussed notions of collective agency. Tollefesen (2002) recognized the reality of a collective mind (i.e. collective intentions). These ideas on collective agency, and also the research by Markus and Kitayama (1991) on the construals of the self, advise the current study to understand the self in relation to intentionality, specifically the attributions of intentionality.

The philosophical contributions on individualistic and collectivist mindsets in reference to intentionality also guide the current research to look at the cultural constructs of individualism and collectivism as examined by Hofstede (1980; 2001) and Triandis (1994). These cultural constructs have been found to influence the perceptions of self (Gudykunst et al., 1996).

The value orientations of collectivism include sustaining harmony and conformity with the ideals and desires of the group rather than the desires of the individual. This focus on others’ needs is likely to influence the perception of intentionality differently
than a focus on personal intentional needs, desires, and goals. Moreover, the emphasis on sustaining harmony renders any kind of conflict as socially undesirable, and, therefore, the intentions of an instigator become more salient. The current study postulates that collectivism will be more associated with the attribution of intentionality than individualism.

The cultural constructs of individualism and collectivism are complex because aspects of each cultural value orientation can coexist. Triandis et al., (1993) discussed that these value orientations were thought to be internalized within the individual. Hence at the individual level, the term that corresponds with the value orientation of individualism is the independent self, and the value orientation of collectivism corresponds with the interdependent self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Therefore, this study will examine how the cultural value orientations of individualism and collectivism influence the construals of the self as independent and interdependent.

Thus, it was argued that cultural value orientation influences the perception of intentionality. Cultural value orientation also influences the perception of self. Although no direct linear relations between self and the perception of intentionality have been established in previous studies, this study infers this relation because the self (or agency) is so closely associated with intentionality (Bandura, 2001; Brandstätter, 1999; Brandstätter & Lerner, 1999). Recall that research on intentionality and self has been concerned with how an individual accomplishes an intentional goal. However, Markus and Kitayama (1991) have demonstrated that the perception of self is not just a bounded autonomous being. As there are two kinds of selves (independent and interdependent), perceptions of personal intentional states and the subsequent actions may be viewed
differently. Therefore, it is likely that, if intentionality within the agent is different, how
the agent construes the intentionality of others might also be affected. As the
interdependent self tends to be more attuned to the context and sensitive to the needs of
others, and is a product of the collectivist value orientation, it is also likely this type of
self may be more related to the attribution of intentionality.

The current study examines how individualism and collectivism affects the perception
of intentionality. Additionally, it will also examine how individual level factors such as
the independent and interdependent self affect the perception of intentionality in a
conflict situation.

General Hypothesis

1. A structural equation model based on the hypothesized and theory-based
   relations among collectivism, individualism, and independent and interdependent
   construals of self as antecedents to the attribution of intentionality will fit the data.

Specific Hypotheses

2. The construal of self as independent or interdependent is likely to be influenced
   by scores on collectivism and individualism. Individualism is expected to relate to
   independent construal of self, and collectivism is expected to relate to
   interdependent construal of self.

3. Variations in the cultural value orientations will be predictive of variations in the
   person's perception of intentionality of the instigation in a conflict situation,
   directly and through influences on construals of the self.
4. The interdependent self is expected to be the best predictor of the perception of intentionality in comparison to cultural value orientations and the independent self-construal.
Methods

Participants

A total of 225 college students were recruited from two public universities in Southern California. The inducement for participation included extra-credit points towards a course fulfillment. Participants were 44 male and 181 female. The mean age of the sample was 26 ($SD=8.26$) with a range of 18-59 years old. The ethnic backgrounds of the participants were as follows: 78 Latino-Americans (13 males, 65 females), 62 Anglo-Americans/Non-Latino (13 males, 49 females), 39 African-American (5 males, 34 females), and 34 Asian Americans (10 males, 24 females).

Measures

An instrument that included measures of cultural value orientations, construal of the self, and the perception of intentionality was administered (see Appendix B-F). The questionnaires were divided into five sections, which are described below.

Individualism and collectivism scale. The Cultural Value Orientation scale developed by Triandis, et al. (1993) measured scores on individualism and collectivism (see Appendix B). This scale was administered first in order to activate the participant’s own orientations on the cultural dimensions. This scale consists of 32 original items, and 4 new items were added based on more salient theoretical descriptions of the values about the self, inherent in individualism and collectivism. For the individualist variable, the following two items were added, “I value the sense of self as a rugged individual, independent from others,” and “I have been raised to attend to my own thoughts, behaviors and feelings.” For the collectivism variable, these items were added, “I value the ideal sense of self as one who is harmonious with others,” and “I have been raised to
pay close attention to others’ behaviors, thoughts and feelings.” Participants rated on all 36 items 1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient for the 32 items was .81, and .83 with the additional 4 items. The 32-item scale was utilized for subsequent analyses because the improvement in alphas was not substantial. The subscales for individualism and collectivism constructs were divided because individualism and collectivism are not opposite ends of one dimension (Triandis et al, 1993).

There were 16 items that measured collectivism. Collectivism was defined as seeking harmony with the group, loyalty to the family, and interdependence with others. Items on the collectivism scale included statements such as “It is important for me to maintain harmony in my group,” “If a relative were in financial difficulty, I would help within my means,” and “I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group”. The Cronbach’s α for the collectivism scale was .81.

There were 16 items that measured individualism. Individualism was operationalized as how much participants value being a unique individual, felt competition with others, and reliance on the self. Statements that tap into the individualistic construct include items such as “I’d rather depend on myself than others,” “When another student does better than I do, I get tense and aroused,” and “Being a unique individual is important to me.” Cronbach’s α coefficient for the individualism scale was .82.

Self-construal scale. The Self-Construal Scale (SCS) developed by Singelis (1994) was used to identify independent and interdependent selves (see Appendix C). This scale consists of 24 items and has been used in numerous studies on self-construal research that involve gender, self-esteem among many other domains (Yeh & Arora, 2003; Cross,
Bacon, & Morris, 2000; Sato & Cameron, 1999; Kashima, Yamaguchi, Kim, Choi, Gelfand, Yuki, 1995). Singelis (1994) found that a Confirmatory Factor Analysis comparing a one-factor model versus a two-factor model for independence and interdependence showed a better fit for the two-factor model (AGFI= .824, $\chi^2$ (251) = 690.93). There were 12 items that measured independence and 12 items that measured interdependence. Participants rated all items of the scale from 1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree. The Cronbach's alpha reliability for the entire scale was .74 for the current study.

The independent self-construal was defined as the belief of the self as bounded, unitary, stable and separate from the social context. The independent self-construal also included an emphasis on the internal abilities, thoughts, feelings, and expressing the unique self and directness of communication. The items on the independent self-construal included, "Speaking up during a class is not a problem for me," "I am the same person at home that I am at school," and "I act the same way no matter whom I am with." Higher scores indicated higher levels of the independent self-construal. The Cronbach's alpha = .72 for the independent scale.

The interdependent self-construal was defined by having a sense of self as bounded to others, and this self is flexible and attentive to social roles, status, and relationships. Interdependent self-construal also was related to how much a person feels intertwined with others and considers the self as part of the context rather than separate entities. The items on the interdependent scale included, "I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I’m not happy with the group," "I respect people who are modest about
themselves". The Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the interdependent scale ($\alpha = .79$) was much higher than the entire scale.

**Description of conflict.** Following the SCS, participants were asked to describe a conflict scenario they had encountered within the last year with another person (see Appendix D). Subsequently, some questions were asked as an attempt to contextualize the nature of the conflict. They were instructed to indicate how long ago the conflict occurred, whom the conflict involved, where it occurred, and whether if they believed the individual they were in conflict with was a close person. Participants were also asked to indicate if they felt the conflict was resolved. Additional items asked participants to rate the experience of the conflict, how the family they grew up in viewed conflict, and the outcome of the conflict on a scale of 1 (*Negative*)—7 (*Positive*).

**Attribution of intentionality scale.** The Attribution-Emotion Scale (AES), developed by Betancourt, Guthrie, Hodges and Batista (2002), was used to assess the participants' perception of intentionality and controllability of the action, and related interpersonal emotions in response to the conflict situation (see Appendix E). The Attribution-Emotion Scale (AES) consisted of 11 items that was comprised of two non-orthogonal factors: Intentionality (5 items) and internal controllability of the action (3 items). The 3 items remaining assessed for external controllability of the action (i.e. controlled by others), but were not used in the primary analyses. Although the perception of internal and external controllability is of lesser importance in this study, internal controllability was assessed because the attribution of controllability is conceptually related to the attribution of intentionality. Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients were .63 for the internal controllability factor and .90 for the intentionality factor.
Following this portion of the AES, participants were asked to write down what they believed to be the cause of the other person's behavior. Based on the cause they wrote, they were asked to rate a revised version of the Causal Dimension Scale—II (CDS-II), developed by McAuley, Russell, & Duncan, (1992) to assess personal controllability, stability, and locus of control of the cause. Although controllability was assessed two times, the difference is that the former (internal controllability) corresponds to attributions about the action, and the latter (personal controllability) corresponds to attributions about the cause of the individual's behavior. Although the perception of stability and personal controllability for the cause is of lesser importance, the locus of control (i.e. dispositional) is relevant to perceiving intentionality (Jones & Davis, 1965). The Cronbach's alpha reliability for locus was $\alpha = .78$, $\alpha = .78$ for personal controllability, and $\alpha = .54$ for stability.

The last part of the AES (16 items) assessed the participant's experience of several emotions, such as anger, compassion, and distressed feelings in response to the conflict. The Cronbach's alpha for angry feelings was $\alpha = .88$, $\alpha = .88$ for compassion, and $\alpha = .83$ for distressed emotions (e.g. guilt, shame, embarrassed, depressed, and lonely.

Demographics. General information about the participants was requested (see Appendix F). Information requested were the participants' age, gender, ethnicity, religion, citizenship status, and program of study. No identifying information was required.

Procedures

The researcher first contacted sponsoring faculty from two undergraduate institutions to request students as participants for the study. The students were from two
local universities (California State Polytechnic University, Pomona and California State University, San Bernardino). Data collection procedures were in compliance with each university's protocol.

From California State University, San Bernardino, a flyer posting several dates and times for participation in the study was posted on a central bulletin board. There were a total of eight days within a span of four weeks for students to participate. Students wrote their names on a sheet that was most convenient for them and reported to a specified room on the day of their participation. Upon their arrival, they were given a cover letter that described the nature of the study and the expectations of them (see Appendix A). They were then asked to check the cover letters indicating that they read the cover letter and agree to participate. If they chose not to participate, they were allowed to leave. All students agreed to participate, and the questionnaire was handed to them. They were allotted up to 30 minutes for completing the questionnaire. After they finished, they were given an extra credit slip worth 4 units to be used in any class they chose. Approximately 200 questionnaires were collected from this school.

From Cal Poly Pomona, the announcement of the study was posted on a website. Students signed up on the web for a date that was most convenient for them. At Cal Poly, there were only a total of two days possible for participation because the subject pool was smaller. Upon students' arrival, the procedures were exactly the same as Cal State San Bernardino. However, they were asked to write their names on a note card and slip it into a drop box in order for the researcher to know who participated in the study. This was necessary because only the researcher had access to the web page to award the extra credit points. Approximately 25 questionnaires were collected from this school.
Results

Preliminary Analyses

Assumptions. The assumptions of normality, and linearity were examined for all relevant variables of the study. All variables (attribution of intentionality, individualism, independent and interdependent selves) of the study were found to be within the acceptable range of \( z = \pm 1.96 \), except for collectivism. Collectivism had one extreme outlier \( (z = -7.50) \) and this initially resulted in a negatively skewed distribution. Therefore, this case was deleted in further analyses. Subsequent analyses resulted in 224 cases to be studied.

Correlations. A correlation matrix comparing the total scores of individualism, collectivism, independent self, interdependent self, the perception of intentionality, and all other relevant variables of the study are presented in Table 1 (Table 2 represents partial correlations of gender and ethnicity controlled). The additional variables included the perception of personal and other's control of the action, causal attribution processes (e.g. locus of control, personal controllability, other controllability, and stability), perceived experience of the conflict as positive or negative, and related interpersonal emotions (e.g. anger, compassion, distressed feelings). Although the additional variables were not central to the hypotheses of this study, they were included in the correlations to examine the general relations among all theoretically relevant variables to the attribution of intentionality. As can be seen, there are numerous significant correlations.

A positive relation was found between individualism and collectivism value orientations. Individualism was positively related to the independent self-construal, attribution of controllability of the action, and internal locus. Collectivism was positively
related to the interdependent self-construal, as well as the independent self-construal. The independent self-construal positively related with the perception of controllability of the action. According to this matrix, the variables related to the attribution of intentionality were the perception of personal controllability of the action, and dispositional causal attributions. The perception of intentionality was not related to cultural value orientations of individualism, collectivism, or the independent and interdependent construal of the self.

Table 1

Correlation matrix of all relevant variables

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Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlation between Stability and View, r = -.13*

Table 2

Partial Correlations of Main Variables Controlled for the Effects of Gender and Ethnicity

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Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Factorial ANOVA was used to test for potential effects of gender and ethnicity on the model variables of individualism, collectivism, independent self, interdependent self, and intentionality (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations). Graphs 1-5 represent the estimated marginal mean scores and possible interaction effects of gender and ethnicity on individualism, collectivism, independent, interdependence, and perception of intentionality. The graphs indicate that interactions between gender and ethnicity on the variables were not significant. For individualism, the omnibus test showed a main effect of gender, $F(1, 224) = 4.53, p = .03$, with males ($M = 79.18, SD = 13.52$) being more individualistic than females ($M = 74.97, SD = 11.19$). For independent self, the omnibus test revealed a main effect for ethnicity $F(4, 224) = 5.14, p = .00$. Post hoc analysis using the LSD procedures revealed that African Americans ($M = 68.64, SD = 8.66$) were higher than Asian Americans ($M = 58.52, SD = 10.48$, $p = .00$) on the independent self-construal. Although ANOVA results suggested gender and ethnicity may be potential covariates of the dependent variables, subsequent analyses presented did not control for them.
Table 3

Comparison of Mean Scores (and Standard Deviations) for Main Variables of the study

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<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Individualism</th>
<th>Collectivism</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Interdependent</th>
<th>Intentionality</th>
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<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>Anglo-American</td>
<td>76.11</td>
<td>12.06</td>
<td>79.56</td>
<td>9.71</td>
<td>64.82</td>
</tr>
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<td>African-American</td>
<td>76.92</td>
<td>11.21</td>
<td>80.90</td>
<td>11.24</td>
<td>68.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian-American</td>
<td>76.00</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>87.27</td>
<td>8.63</td>
<td>58.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino-American</td>
<td>74.45</td>
<td>11.50</td>
<td>83.72</td>
<td>10.52</td>
<td>62.82</td>
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| Sex               | M    | SD  | M    | SD  | M    | SD  | M    | SD  | M    | SD  |
|-------------------| M    | SD  | M    | SD  | M    | SD  | M    | SD  | M    | SD  |
| Male              | 79.18 | 13.52 | 82.85 | 9.11 | 63.72 | 11.01 | 63.00 | 9.70 | 22.74 | 9.64 |
| Female            | 74.97 | 11.19 | 82.56 | 10.95 | 64.02 | 9.85 | 61.06 | 10.65 | 18.63 | 8.81 |
Graph 1. Individualism Value Orientation by Ethnicity and Sex of Participant
Note: Interaction is not significant, $F(4, 224) = 1.16, p = .33$

Graph 2. Collectivism Value Orientation by Ethnicity and Sex of Participant
Note: Interaction is not significant, $F(4, 224) = 0.527, p = .72$. 
Graph 3. Independent Self-Construal by Ethnicity and Sex of Participant
Note: Interaction is not significant, $F(4, 224) = 1.47, p = .21$.

Graph 4. Interdependent Self-Construal by Ethnicity and Sex of Participant
Note: Interaction is not significant, $F(4, 224) = 1.09, p = .36$. 
Graph 5. The Perception of Intentionality by Ethnicity and Sex of Participant

Note: Interaction is not significant, $F(4, 224) = .86, p = .49$. 

---

Perception of Intentionality
Test of Hypotheses

Bentler’s (1995) EQS program for structural equation modeling was used to analyze the structure of relations among the variables proposed to influence intentionality as well as specific hypotheses of the study. Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a statistical methodology that takes a hypothesis-testing approach to the multivariate analysis of a structural theory from a set of sample data (Byrne, 1994). Structural equation modeling allows for the incorporation of factor structure while testing simultaneous paths, and also accounting for measurement error. Typically a model is proposed by the researcher grounded in theory, past empirical research in the area of study, or both. Once a model has been specified (see Figure 2 for example), the plausibility of this model is tested based on sample data that comprise all the observed variables in the model.

Figure 2. Measurement Model For Testing General Hypothesis

The primary task of model testing is to determine the goodness of fit between the covariance matrixes from an approximation of population values to the covariance matrix
from the observed data. There are several fit indices to indicate the goodness of fit, however, typically the more popular and common one used is the Comparative Fit Index (CFI). In general, the structure of the theoretical model is compared to a model of no relations among the variables. The degree to which these two models differ yields a Comparative Fit Index (CFI). This fit index range from 0 to 1 with higher scores indicating a better fit of the specified model over the null model (Byrne, 1994). CFI values greater than .90 are indicative of adequate fitting models whereas values of .95 are indicative of a good fitting model (Bentler, 1995). Also a Chi-square test was used to determine the degree to which the estimated covariance matrix matches the data covariance matrix. In general, a $\chi^2$ significance test greater than .05 is indicative of a good/close-fitting model. However, given that the null hypothesis of a perfect fit is an unrealistic standard (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999), nonsignificant $\chi^2$ results are not expected. One standard proposed for a good fit is $\chi^2$/df values less than 3 (Kline, 1998). The Root Mean Square Error Analysis (RMSEA) is another indicator of a close fit between the model and the data. By convention, RMSEA values of less than .05 indicates a close fit, values between .05 and .08 indicate an acceptable fit, and values between .08 and .10 indicate marginal fit (Fabrigar, et al., 1999). EQS generally regards all variables as falling into either measured (observed, manifest) variables, which is represented by squares, and unmeasured (latent, factors) variables, which is represented by circles.

**Measurement Model**

There were several ways in which the hypothesized model could have been tested. For the purposes of this study, the manifest variable model of cultural value orientations,
the construal of the self, and a latent factor of the attribution of intentionality was preferred. This model was preferred because there is much debate in the literature on the sub dimensions of collectivism, and individualism (Oyserman, et. al., 2002). These debates complicate the development of appropriate indicators of each latent factor of cultural value orientations. As the purpose of the current study was not to resolve the debates related to measures of collectivism and individualism, but rather how the general concepts of these constructs influence attribution processes, the cultural variables were represented by two manifest variables. Representing the self-construal by latent factors was also not preferred because there have not been enough literature to support dividing these constructs into subcomponents (Hardin, Leong, & Bhagwat, 2004). The measurement model is depicted in Figure 2. This model represents all proposed relations among cultural value orientations, construal of the self and the perception of intentionality. This model consists of one latent factor, and nine manifest variables.

The first manifest variable represents the total mean score of individualism that derived from 16-item subscale of the Collectivism and Individualism (CI) Scale (Triandis et al, 1986). The second manifest variable represents collectivism, which is the mean score of the 16-item subscale from the CI Scale.

The observed variables of independent and interdependent self-construal were developed from the Self Construal Scale (Singelis, 1994). The independent variable represents the averaged score of all the independent items derived from the Independent sub-scale. The interdependent variable is developed from the averaged score of all interdependent items from the Interdependent sub-scale. The latent variable, the
attribution of intentionality is composed of five original items that derived from the revised Attribution-Emotion Scale developed by Betancourt, et al., (2002).

According to Figure 2, it was expected that the path from individualism to the independent self-construal will be positive and significant, and the path from collectivism to the interdependent self will be the same. Individualism and collectivism is expected to covary partly because the participants recruited for the study (undergraduates in the United States) are likely to hold both value orientations. This model also shows that the path from collectivism to the perception of intentionality is expected to be positive, and the path from the interdependent self-construal to intentionality is expected to be positive. The path from independent self to intentionality is also expected to be positive.

Model Estimation: The first test of the model representing the proposed set of relations among cultural value orientation, the construal of the self as determinants of the inference of intentionality fit the data well. The independence model that tests the hypothesis that the variables are uncorrelated with one another was easily rejected, $\chi^2 (36, N=224) = 945.86, p<.00$. The chi-square test for the fit between the independence model and the hypothesized model was $\chi^2 (25, N=224)= 78.82, p<.00, (\chi^2 / df = 3.15)$. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .94, Root Mean Square Error Analysis (RMSEA) = .10, $R^2 = .01$ for the whole model (see Figure 3).
Model Modifications. Post hoc model modifications were performed in an attempt to obtain a better fitting model. The modifications were made based on conceptually acceptable relations derived from the Lagrange Multiplier Tests for adding parameters. A path from individualism to the interdependent construal of the self was added. The addition of this path improved the Chi square test, $\chi^2 (24, 224) = 74.13, p < .00, (\chi^2 / df = 3.10)$ CFI = .95, $R^2 = .01$. Figure 4 represents the model with these modifications.
Specific Hypotheses. Based on the test of the modified model, the general hypothesis was confirmed. As can be observed in Figure 4, the specific hypothesis that the construal of the self is likely to be influenced by cultural value orientation was strongly supported. Individualism influenced the independent construal of self (standardized solution = .38, p < .00), and collectivism influenced the interdependent self-construal (standardized solution = .74, p < .00). The specific hypothesis that cultural value orientation (i.e. collectivism) would directly and indirectly through the construal of the self influence the perception of intentionality was not supported.

Additional Analyses

The purpose of this study was to understand the attribution of intentionality in relation to culture and the construal of the self, within the context of a structural equation model. Thus far, results have demonstrated that cultural value orientations and the construal of the self do not have a direct or indirect influence on the attribution of
intentionality. However, other variables relevant to studying attribution of intentionality have not been included in the tests of the models. To fully comprehend the phenomena of intentionality, a broader model examining other relevant variables, within the context of culture, self, and the perception of intentionality was essential to exam. In particular, two variables of interest were the causal attributions of locus of control (dispositional versus situational), and the perception of personal controllability.

*Locus and Controllability.* Personal controllability is a relevant factor because Weiner (1986; 1995) theorized that it is almost impossible to attribute intentionality in others’ behaviors without perceiving controllability of the cause. Recall Weiner believed that the attribution of intent is usually last in a chain of causal attribution processes including perceiving internal locus, controllability, and then judgment of responsibility. Jones and Davis (1965), however, believed that “intentions paved the rocky road from acts to dispositions” (Rosati, et al, 2001, p.302). This meant perceiving intent in others was a key step in attributing a positive or negative disposition (i.e. internal attributions). Moreover, dispositional attributions have been studied in relation to cultural value orientations (Knowles, et. al., 2001).

A broader, general model (see Figure 5) incorporating these two additional factors of controllability and internal locus within the context of the hypothesized model was tested. This model shows culture variables remained the same as two measured variables (obtained by the total mean scores of the individualism subscale and the collectivism subscale). The construal of the self remained the same as two manifest variables from the previous model. This model also contained three latent constructs (internal locus,
controllability, and intentionality). The internal locus construct composed of two indicators (obtained from two individual items from AES), and controllability consisted of three indicators (three individual items from the AES), and intentionality remained the same with five indicators. The paths from the cultural orientations to self-construal were the same. The paths from collectivism to intentionality and from the construals of the self to intentionality were retained in the test of the model. Additionally, the four measured variables of cultural value orientation and self-construals also predicted the two new constructs of locus and controllability. The path from cultural value orientations to the locus of control was added because previous literature by Knowles, et al., (1999) demonstrated that a cultural value orientation influences dispositional attributions (i.e.
internal locus of control). The path from cultural value orientations to internal controllability was added because a study by Zaw (2002) demonstrated that controllability is a function of value orientations. The self-construal variables were expected to relate to these variables because the self-construal may mediate these relations.

The broad hypothesis that locus and controllability would mediate the relations between culture, self, and intentionality was confirmed. The first run of the model showed that the independence model testing the hypothesis that the variables are uncorrelated with one another was easily rejected, $\chi^2 (91, 224) = 1234.83, p < .00$. The Chi-square test for the fit between the independence model and the hypothesized model was $\chi^2 (64, N=224) = 127.21, p < .00, (\chi^2 / df = 1.98)$. The Comparative Fit Index showed a good fit (CFI = .94, RMSEA = .07).

Post hoc modifications were performed according to the Wald Test for dropping parameters and the Lagrange for adding parameters. The results of these modifications can be observed in Figure 6. Based on the Wald Test, and for the sake of a parsimonious model, several paths were dropped. All paths from culture and self-construal variables to intentionality were dropped. The path from individualism to internal locus of control was also dropped. Based on Lagrange, one path from individualism to interdependence was added. The results of these modifications revealed a better fit of the data, $\chi^2 (69, N=224) = 125.03, p < .00 (\chi^2 / df= 1.81), \text{CFI} = .95, \text{RMSEA} = .06, R^2 = .15.$
The model in Figure 6 shows that although cultural value orientation and the construal of the self may not have a direct and indirect effect on the perception of intentionality, the cultural value orientation and the construal of the self affects the cognitive/attribution processes that in turn affect the perception of intentionality. The path from internal locus to intentionality was positive (standardized solution = .18, p < .02), and the path from controllability to intentionality was also positive (standardized solution = .33, p < .00). In addition, the path from individualism to controllability was positive (standardized solution = .21, p < .01). The relations between cultural value orientations and the construal of selves remained significant.
While the current study sought to understand the attribution of intentionality in relation to culture and the construal of self, within the context of a conflict situation, this study did not test how all other variables examined in this study (e.g. view of the conflict, interpersonal emotions, outcome of the conflict) might influence the attribution of intent. Moreover, the specific types of conflict, the nature of the conflict, and with whom the conflict experience involved (i.e. spouse, siblings, friends, boyfriends/girlfriends, roommates, colleagues, professors, coworkers, supervisors, or strangers) was not delineated. The over-arching general model incorporating these other variables within a specific conflict scenario is beyond the main interests of the current study that sought to understand the general model of attribution of intentionality in terms of cultural value orientation and the construal of the self.
Discussion

Summary and Interpretations of Results

The current study examined predictors for the attribution of intentionality. Whereas several variables can be considered, this study proposed a model of how cultural value orientation and the construal of the self predict the perception of intent. Initial results revealed that the data fit the model well, and cultural value orientation influenced the construal of the self. However, the specific hypotheses that cultural value orientation directly and indirectly through the construal of the self would predict the attribution of intentionality was not supported. Although cultural value orientation and the self served as weak predictors of the attribution of intentionality, additional analyses revealed several interesting findings. These analyses showed cultural value orientation and the construal of the self indirectly predict the attribution of intentionality through cognitive/attribution processes such as controllability and locus of control. The implications of these findings are manifold.

One implication of the findings supports Jones and Davis's (1965) conceptualization of the role of the socio-cultural context in perceiving intentionality and dispositional attributions. Whereas Weiner’s theory ignored the influence of socio-cultural factors in attribution processes, the current study supported Jones and Davis’ conceptualization that individuals attend to the social context to form opinions and judgments of others’ behaviors. Specifically, the results revealed that cultural value orientation of individualism influenced the independent self-construal, which influenced dispositional attributions, and in turn influenced the perception of intentionality. In other words, being socialized to uphold individualist values influences the belief about the self.
as independent from others, which affects the belief that others’ behaviors are caused by dispositional factors, as well as an underlying mental state (i.e. intentionality). Although Jones and Davis believed perceptions of intentionality preceded dispositional attributions, this study showed that culture and its related variables (e.g. the self) are a function of dispositional attributions, which in turn affect the perception of intentionality. This relation between cultural variables and dispositional attributions also support past studies by Knowles et al., (2001), Menon et al., (2001), in that value orientation of independence influences one’s belief about dispositional causes to behaviors (i.e., personality traits).

The current study further implies that perceiving dispositional causes to others’ behaviors leads to perceiving an underlying intent of others’ behaviors.

Although the current study showed dispositional attributions lead to intentional attributions, these findings somewhat challenges Weiner’s (1986) view that the perception of controllability immediately follows dispositional attributions. In Weiner’s view, when an event occurs and dispositional causes are perceived, individuals assess for controllability of the action, which leads to judgment of responsibility. Attributions of intentionality are assessed only after judgments of responsibility have been made. The results in this study, however, suggest that perceptions of intentionality may precede judgment of responsibility because the results showed that perception of intentionality is a direct function of controllability. Although judgment of responsibility was not assessed in the current study, this study showed perceiving controllability of the action strongly predicted perceiving intentionality. The exact order in which locus, controllability, responsibility, and intentionality operate is not yet clear from the results, as the purpose
was not to confirm a model for the linear order of these relations. Future studies may examine the order of the attribution process in relation to cultural value orientations.

The purpose of this study, however, was to understand the attribution of intentionality as a dependent variable within the context of cultural value orientation and its related variables. As such, the results showed that the individualist value orientation directly predicted controllability, which, in turn, influenced the attribution of intentionality. The implication of this finding is that broader cultural ideals may influence judgment of controllability because various cultures may shape individuals in how the sense of control, and the source of control, is viewed. In fact, there are cultural value orientations that correspond with the sense of control over one's life, which past researches have termed fatalism and mastery (Betancourt & Fuentes, 2001; Betancourt, Hardin, & Manzi, 1996; McMillin, 2002). For example, in the case of health and illness, the cultural value orientations of mastery alludes to the sense of personal control over one's health, whereas fatalistic values defer control to an external power, such as God or nature (see McMillin, 2002; Flynn, 2003). The results of the current study further imply that having an individualist orientation and a sense of personal power over one's life, affect the perception of controllability in others' behaviors as well. Moreover, perceiving controllability in others' behaviors also influences the perception of an underlying mental state causing a behavior. Although Weiner's theory was supported in demonstrating that the attribution of intentionality is subsequent to the attribution of intentionality, the findings in this study suggest that attribution processes are not decontextualized from the socio-cultural context that shape value orientation, and in turn influence attribution processes.
In general, one of the most important implications of the current study is that, when thinking about others' behaviors, the cultural values to which the perceiver is oriented play a significant role in how judgments and opinions are formed about the behavior. That is, attribution processes are embedded in a particular cultural context, which individuals internalize as their cultural value orientation. As this study showed, the internalized cultural value orientation influences individuals' cognitive processes (i.e. attribution processes), particularly for the individualists. Although the current study was specifically interested in how the collectivist value orientation influences attribution processes, the results did not necessarily show support for these hypotheses. The details for not finding these results will be addressed in the limitations section. One particular reason may be due to the complexity of the collectivist value orientation (e.g. in-group out-group distinctions) and the embeddedness of the participants in an individualist culture. As such, there are several practical implications of the results within an individualist culture. These results may especially be relevant for practicing clinicians in how the individualist culture in which they practice can shape their own attribution processes in dealing with clients with various cultural value orientations.

Clinical Applications. In the United States, clinical psychologists in training are often indirectly socialized to master the individualist value orientation. This is partly because the roots of Western Psychology stem from Western European values that include individualist ideals. As the mainstream dominant cultural value in the United States continues to be individualism (i.e. the idea that individuals are unique, and independent from others, and in control of one's own destiny), clinicians may find it beneficial to transmit the cultural value of individualism to help clients adjust in the
mainstream culture. Whether or not clinicians have personal preferences for collectivist or individualist value orientation is not the main issue. Clinicians are still trained to work within individualistic context and transmit individualist values within the therapeutic relationship.

If clinicians are trained to work around individualist values, they must also perceive more controllability of their clients' behaviors. As this study suggest, individualism has direct effects on the attribution of controllability. The theoretical importance of this is that if controllability is perceived, it is more likely that intentionality may also be perceived. One implication of perceiving intentionality (i.e., the underlying mental causes in another person's behavior) is that it can lead to positive or negative outcomes.

The positive aspect of perceiving intentionality in clients' behaviors could be that the clinician can distinguish clients' actions as caused by static dispositions versus fluid intentions. If clinicians can see that behaviors are caused by the intentions that results from a perception of control, they may be more optimistic about change by helping clients become more aware of the underlying mental process that drives their particular behaviors. If, however, clients' behaviors are attributed to static dispositional traits, the motivation to see change in the client may not be as likely. Attributing behavior to dispositional traits tends to be superficial and falls short of fully understanding the mental process motivating a behavior. This mental process (intentions) could be situational in that intentional states flow with changes in situations (Rosati, et al., 2001). If clinicians are able to appreciate the fluidity of mental states, they may be more helpful by bringing attention to the mental process, rather than calling attention to a personality trait.
The potentially negative aspect of assuming intentionality in clients’ behaviors is that one cannot usually perceive intent without judgment. Typically, judgment of another is followed by delivery of social consequences toward that other. If clinicians are not careful in suspending the judgment that follows intent, it can influence how they behave toward the client, which can result in serious negative outcomes. Clinicians do not bear responsibility to deliver rewards or punishment for clients’ behaviors. Rather, they share some responsibility in helping clients to adjust and adapt to the dominant cultural values. Particularly, for the clinicians practicing in the U.S., part of that responsibility involves socializing and transmitting individualist value orientations. At the same time, clinicians are expected to appreciate that clients’ behaviors are a function of situationally caused fluid mental states.

In this respect, it appears that the art of being a clinician may involve being able to appreciate others’ situational factors (which tends to be collectivistic), while helping others to develop a stronger sense of self and identity (which tends to be individualistic). This may be particularly helpful in a Western individualist culture like the U.S. This does not, however, yield information on how practicing clinicians may operate in collectivist cultures. Future studies should examine how practicing clinicians in Eastern collectivist cultures deal with clients from various cultures. Would practicing clinicians in Eastern collectivist cultures transmit collectivist values by helping clients to become more aware of their situations? Would they foster individual identity development?

Limitations

Although the results in this study have several implications, some limitations of the study must be addressed. One limitation of this study was the lack of support for the
hypothesized relation between the collectivist value orientation and the attribution processes (e.g., intentionality). A reason for this finding may be that collectivism may influence attribution processes, depending on who judgments are to be made about. There may be a distinction in how collectivists attribute intent toward members of in-groups versus how they infer intent in members of out-groups. As past research by Pearson and Stephan (1998) has demonstrated, collectivists generally respond to in-group and out-group members differently.

Although in-group and out-group distinction was assessed, (by assessing perceived closeness of the other) the current study did not include this variable in tests of the models. One reason for this neglect was that participants in the current study did not express a strict collectivist view of in-groups. That is, perceiving closeness with others does not equate to traditional collectivist consideration of in-groups. The traditional collectivist view of in-groups is that individuals are bound together by kinship, ethnicity, tribe, or nation. Participants' view of in-groups for this study reflected the individualist view of in-groups, in that they perceived individuals from other ethnicity or nationality as in-groups. The individualist view of in-groups is that boundaries are loose, bound together by shifting beliefs and ideologies. As traditional studies on in-group and out-group distinctions are most apparent from the collectivist view of in-groups (Hofstede, 2002), the current study did not provide sufficient theoretical support for measures of in-groups and out-groups. Future studies may need to manipulate the in-group and out-group distinction in order to understand how this distinction moderates the relation between value orientations of collectivism and attribution processes.
An additional limitation was that the construal of the conflict situation as negative or positive was not taken into consideration in the model. As the collectivism value orientation is associated with social norms that require group harmony, people high on collectivism may be more likely to view conflict as more negative and view the actions of the other more negatively. As previous researchers have noted, the negative actions of others calls attention to the person’s intentions that lead to the perception of dispositional attributions (see Jones & Davis, 1965). The negative construal of conflict may have mediated the relations between cultural value orientation and the perception of intentionality. This variable was not tested in the model. If it had been included, it may be likely that collectivism would also indirectly and positively relate to the attribution of intentionality through the view of the conflict as a negative experience. Future studies may need to control for the view of conflict as mediating cultural value orientation and attribution processes.

Another limitation also pertaining to the conflict experiences was that this study did not delineate the specific types of conflict the participants encountered. Even though participants were requested to specify an interpersonal conflict with only one other individual, the severity and the outcomes of the conflict varied. As participants were asked to recall and write down their own subjective conflict situation, it is difficult to tell how specific conflict situations would have altered the general model. Therefore, the generalizability of the findings to all types and severity of conflict situations and outcomes is limited. Future studies in this area may find a way to focus on one particular type of conflict.
The general limitations of this study concern generalizability and the methodology. The generalizability is limited to undergraduate college students in Southern California. In addition, the over representations of females in the study also suggest that these results may not generalize evenly to males as much for females. The methodology in current research may be also improved in measuring cultural value orientation, the construal of the self, as well as the inferences of intentionality. Researchers in the past have noted that identifying cultural value orientation may not always be a declarative process that individuals could easily access in paper and pencil form (Oyserman, et al., 2002). This notion may also apply to measures of the self as well as the measures of attribution of intentionality. Additionally, even though the self-construal variables and the cultural value orientation variables are distinct constructs, this study used very similar methodological instruments to measure these variables. Future research in culture and the self may consider using different instruments and methods to identify each construct.

Future Directions

The purpose of this study was to understand the attribution of intentionality in relation to cultural value orientation and the construal of the self. In order to accomplish this goal, this phenomenon was investigated within the context of a conflict situation with undergraduate university students. As such, there were several limitations. To attenuate the limitations, future studies should first address the general limitations regarding the participants and the methodological issues of measurement of cultural value orientation and construal of the self. One way this could be accomplished is to consider measuring only the sub-dimensions of cultural value orientations to explain a particular
phenomenon. For example, individualism is comprised of three main sub dimensions, which include unique individuality, competitiveness with others, and reliance on the self. Collectivism is comprised of three main sub dimensions of harmony with the group, loyalty to family, and interdependence with others. As indicated previously, there are debates on the literature in how individualism and collectivism should be measured (Oyserman, et. al., 2002). Future studies may consider taking additional steps to refine these constructs, rather than using the general concepts of individualism and collectivism.

Future research in this area of culture, attribution process and conflict may also delineate the specific conditions under which the results of this study holds best in several social situations. For example, the assumption behind using a conflict scenario to study cultural differences in intentionality was that conflict generally highlights the dispositions of others. As shown in this study, dispositional attributions influence the perception of intentionality of others in the conflict situation. It seems that the negative behaviors of others are salient in determining intentions that drive behavior. But how are intentions of others perceived when the behavior of the other is positive and pro-social? Would intentionality be perceived in those instances? Would there be cultural variations in attribution processes for altruism?

If research on intentionality and culture is within the context of conflict, another avenue future research may take is to specify the types of conflict situation. That is, conflict between families, between neighbors, between superiors and students/workers should be well defined. Moreover, this general model of cultural value orientation and attribution processes may be tested in live conflict settings that occur in organizations, legal settings, and even community conflict resolution centers. Most importantly, future
research should take into consideration the in-group/out-group status of the opponent, and manipulate the distinction. This may answer the question: Do collectivists perceive more intentionality for out-group versus in-group members?

As generalizability was limited for these results, another way intentionality and culture may be studied is to recruit participants from various populations (e.g., outside of the United States). Such populations may include non-students in work settings, or students embedded in traditionally collectivist cultures. It might also be interesting to extend this model to comparisons between clinical populations versus non-clinical populations. Are there differences in perceptions of intentionality in clinical and non-clinical populations?

In the current study, the attribution of intentionality was the dependent variable of interest, and authors were interested in predictors of the attribution of intentionality versus the outcomes of perceiving intentionality. Future directions in studying intentionality may observe this variable as either an independent variable or mediating another phenomena. Although this study observed interpersonal emotions, it did not analyze how the perception of intent would influence feelings of anger, sympathy and compassion, or other distressed emotions (Betancourt & Blair, 1992). Future research may also include specific conflict resolution preferences and outcomes of the conflict that may be influenced by the attribution of intentionality.

In sum, an all-encompassing model that incorporates the cultural value orientation, the construal of the self, views about the conflict, the causal attribution processes as predictors of intentionality in specific conflict situations, and responses to the conflict may clarify many questions generated from the results of this study.
Closing

When negative events occur in the social environment, individuals look for causes and explanations of these events. Attribution theory corresponds with the area of research that explains the processes by which individuals explain the causes of other people's behaviors. This study is one of few whose results provide empirical support of how cultural value orientation plays a key role in the attribution processes including the perception of intentionality. The important point to be taken from this study is that culture and cultural value orientations are essential in understanding how individuals comprehend, form opinions and judgments about others behaviors, and interpret those behaviors. Attribution processes do not occur outside of the social environment, as individuals are not decontextualized from the social environment. Individuals are embedded in a specific socio-cultural context that shapes how they learn to think about others, and how they behave and respond toward others. As such, culture and cultural value orientation is an essential factor to be taken into consideration in studies on human behavior and human social interactions especially in a multicultural world.
References


Footnotes

Although subsequent analyses did not control for the effects of gender and ethnicity, there were additional models tested controlling for these covariates. Comparisons of all the models including the covariates and the models without the covariates revealed minor differences. The effects of the covariates were removed by obtaining the standardized residual scores of the main variables of the study, via Regression Analyses, using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) program. The residual scores were obtained for individualism, collectivism, independent, interdependent self-construal, five items measuring perceptions of intentionality, three items for controllability, and two items for locus of control. These standardized residual scores were then tested in a structural equation modeling using EQS.

A model similar to Figure 4 was tested. The results of this model revealed very little change from the model with the covariates included. However, some minor changes were in the strength of relations between paths. In particular, the significance of the path from individualism to interdependent self was slightly weaker (p< .05) in the covaried model than the model with the covariates contained (p< .02). Although not significant, the direction of the path from interdependent self to the perception of intentionality became negative in the covaried model. In general all other paths between variables and error terms remained similar in strength and in direction.

A model similar to Figure 6 was tested with the effects of gender and ethnicity controlled. Again the results of this model also showed small changes from the model with the covariates included. Specifically, in the covaried model, the strength of relations from individualism to the interdependent self was stronger than the non-covaried model.
(which seems to be reversed from the previous models). In general, the test of the covaried model showed the relations among all other variables and error terms remained similar in strength and in direction.
Appendix A: Cover Letter

Dear Student,

I am a graduate student in the PhD Clinical Psychology program at Loma Linda University and I am inviting you to participate in a study on attribution theory. The purpose of this study is to gain additional knowledge in how people form opinions about other's behaviors. The Department of Psychology Institutional Review Board at California State University, San Bernardino has approved this study.

Participation in this study is expected to take approximately 30-45 minutes. Involvement in this study requires the completion of a questionnaire. By participating in this study, the exposure to risk is minimal and the risk involved is no greater than what you encounter in everyday school activities.

Your participation is completely voluntary and there is no penalty for not participating. If you choose not to participate in this investigation, you are excused and you may leave. There may not be a direct benefit for you participating in this study, but you may receive extra credit by your professor. You may choose to withdraw from participating at any time without consequences. Your decision to decline to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time will not affect your class standing.

Your responses to this questionnaire are strictly ANONYMOUS and will only be analyzed and presented as part of a larger group of respondents.

I hope that you will decide to participate in this research. I believe that understanding more about culture and attribution processes is important to the knowledge and scientific study of psychology. Thank you for your time and consideration.

If you have any further questions or concerns, you may contact the following people: Gangaw Zaw, Student Investigator, or Hector Betancourt, Ph.D Research Supervisor (909) 558-8577 at Loma Linda University or David Chavez, Ph.D Co-Investigator (909) 880-5572 at California State University, San Bernardino.

If you wish to contact an impartial third party, not associated with this study, regarding any concern or complaint about this study please contact the following:

California State University Institutional Review Board at (909) 880-5027.

By checking or initializing, and dating below, I acknowledge I have read the above information, I freely consent to participate in this study, and I am 18 years or older.

I consent to participate in this study ___/___/

___ I decline to participate ___/___/
Appendix B: Collectivism and Individualism Scale

RATE EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS USING THE SCALE PRESENTED. CIRCLE YOUR ANSWER.

1. My happiness depends very much on the happiness of those around me.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

2. Winning is everything.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

3. I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

4. It annoys me when other people perform better than I do.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

5. It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

6. It is important to me that I do my job better than others.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

7. I like sharing little things with my neighbor.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

8. I enjoy working in situations involving competition.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

9. The well-being of my co-workers is important to me.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

10. I often do my “own-thing”.
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

11. If a relative were in financial difficulty, I would help within my means.
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
12. Competition is the law of nature.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

13. If a co-worker gets a prize I would feel proud
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

14. Being a unique individual is important to me.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

15. To me, pleasure is spending time with others.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

16. When another student does better than I do, I get tense and aroused.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

17. Children should be taught to place duty before pleasure.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

18. Without competition it is not possible to have a good society.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

19. I feel good when I cooperate with others.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

20. I am one of those people that emphasize winning.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

21. It is important to me that I respect decisions made by my group.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

22. I rather depend on myself than others
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

23. Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
24. I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others.

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Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

25. Parents and children must stay together, as much as possible.

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Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

26. My personal identity independent from others is very important to me.

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Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

27. It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice what I want.

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Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

28. My personal identity is very important to me.

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Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

29. I am a unique person, separate from others.

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Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

30. I respect the majority's wishes in groups of which I am a member.

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</tbody>
</table>

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

31. I enjoy being unique and different from others.

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Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

32. It is important to consult close friends and get their ideas before making a decision.

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</tbody>
</table>

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

33. I value the ideal sense of self as a rugged individual independent from others.

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</tbody>
</table>

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

34. I value the ideal sense of self as one who is harmonious with others.

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Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

35. I have been raised to pay close attention to others' behaviors, thoughts, and feelings.

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
36. I have been raised to attend to my own thoughts, behaviors and feelings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Continue on the next page
Appendix C: Self-Construal Scale

Please rate each of the following statements.

1. I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

2. I’d rather say “No” directly, than risk being misunderstood.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

3. It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

4. Speaking up during a class is not a problem for me.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

5. My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

6. Having a lively imagination is important to me.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

7. I would offer my seat in a bus to my professor.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

8. I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

9. I respect people who are modest about themselves.
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

10. I am the same person at home that I am at school.
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

11. I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in.
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
12. Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me.

12. Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me.

13. I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my own accomplishments.

14. I should take into consideration my parents’ advice when making education/career plans.

15. I act the same way no matter whom I am with.

16. I feel comfortable using someone's first name soon after I meet him or her, even when they are much older than I am.

17. It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group.

18. I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I've just met.

19. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects.

20. I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I'm not happy with the group.

21. If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible.
22. My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

23. Even when I strongly disagree with the group members, I avoid an argument.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

24. I value being in good health above everything.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

25. I believe the self exists in relation to others.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

26. I believe the self is a distinct entity unrelated to others.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

Continue on the next page
Appendix D: Description of Conflict

**Directions:** In the space provided below, please describe in a few words a negative conflict situation you have encountered with one other individual within the last year.

The next set of questions will refer to the conflict situation you have described above.

1. When did the conflict happen?
   a. Within the last week
   b. A week to a month ago
   c. A month to 6 months ago
   d. 6 months to 1 year
   e. More than 1 year ago:
      (Specify the year it happened)____________________

2. Who did the conflict involve? Describe the nature of the relationship you have with the individual you had the conflict with.
   a. Friend
   b. Spouse
   c. Boyfriend or Girlfriend
   d. Sibling
   e. Parent: ____Mother ____Father
   f. Other Family (specify): _____________________________
   g. Person from School (specify): _____________________________
   h. Person from Work (specify): _____________________________
   i. Person in a Public Setting (specify): _____________________________
   j. Others in general (specify): _____________________________
3. Would you consider the individual you had the conflict with as part of a close group of friends, family, or another group you consider yourself a member of?

___ No
___ Yes, please explain. Describe characteristics of the person (e.g. age, ethnicity, race, gender, etc...)

4. Indicate where the conflict occurred.

________________________________________________________________________

5. I feel the conflict situation I described was a __________ experience.

1---2---3---4---5---6---7
Negative Neutral Positive

6. Indicate if you believe the conflict was resolved. ___ Yes ___ No

7. Indicate if you believe the outcome of the conflict was

1---2---3---4---5---6---7
Negative Neutral Positive

8. In general, the family I grew up in views conflict as a __________ experience.

1---2---3---4---5---6---7
Negative Neutral Positive

9. Did the conflict upset you? ___ Yes ___ No

10. Do you think the person’s actions were motivated by something ___ Internal ___ External
Appendix E: Attribution Emotion Scale

Consider the conflict scenario you just described. Answer the following questions based on what you believe about the person's actions. Circle ONE number to describe what you think.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Do you believe that what the person did was intentional (the person wanted to do it or wanted to cause the incident that lead to the action)?</td>
<td>Not Intentional 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely Intentional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Do you think it was meant to cause the outcome (to hurt you or cause you damage)?</td>
<td>Not at all meant to cause the outcome 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely meant to cause the outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Do you think it was done on purpose?</td>
<td>Not at all on purpose 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely on purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Do you think the outcome was directed at you?</td>
<td>Not at all directed at me 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely directed at me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Do you think it was deliberate?</td>
<td>Not at all deliberate 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely deliberate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Do you think the action/behavior was something the person could influence?</td>
<td>Could not influence at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely could influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Do you think the person was in control of his or her actions/behavior?</td>
<td>Not at all in control 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely in control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Do you think there was something the person could have done to avoid it?</td>
<td>Could do nothing to avoid it 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely could have done something to avoid it</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Do you think the action was influenced by others?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all influenced by others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely influenced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please indicate who you were thinking of when asked about others

10. Do you think others had control over the person's action?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
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<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Others did not have control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others definitely had control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please indicate who you were thinking of when asked about others

11. Do you think there was something others could have done to avoid it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nothing anyone could have done</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely others could have done</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please indicate who you were thinking of when asked about others

12. Do you think the person's behavior was pre-planned?

<table>
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<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pre-planned</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely Pre-planned</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

13. Do you think the actions were coincidental?

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<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coincidental</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely Coincidental</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Now think again about the conflict situation referred to above. In your opinion, why did the person do this? In the space below, write down what you believe was the **ACTUAL CAUSE OR REASON** for what the person did. Please write it down in the space provided.

---

| Answer the following questions based on the cause you just described above. |

| Circle ONE number to describe what you think. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Was this cause something <strong>within</strong> the person?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Not at all internal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Was this cause something about the situation or circumstances?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Not at all about the situation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Was this cause something about the person?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Not at all about the person</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Was this cause something <strong>external</strong> to the person?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Not at all external to the person</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Was this cause something the person <strong>could influence</strong>?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Could not influence at all</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. Could the person control this cause?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. No control at all</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Was there something the person could have done about this cause?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>4</th>
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<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Could do nothing at all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Definitely could do something</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Was this cause something others could influence?

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<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Others could not influence at all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others could definitely influence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please indicate who you were thinking of when asked about others

9. Could others have controlled this cause?

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<th>1</th>
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<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Others could not have controlled at all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Definitely others could have controlled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please indicate who you were thinking of when asked about others

10. Was there something others could have done about the cause?

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<tr>
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<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nothing others could have done</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Definitely something others could have done</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please indicate who you were thinking of when asked about others

11. Is this cause something temporary?

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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all temporary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Definitely temporary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. Is this cause something stable over time?

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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all stable over time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Definitely stable over time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Is this cause something that can change in the future?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all changeable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Definitely changeable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Please think about how you felt toward the person as a result of the conflict. Circle ONE number to indicate how much you experienced the following emotions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Did the conflict upset you?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Did you feel irritation toward the person?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Were you frustrated by the person's behavior?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Did the person's behavior make you feel angry?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Were you enraged by the person's behavior?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Did you experience hostility towards the person?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Did you feel compassion for the person?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Did you feel sympathetic toward the person?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Did you feel pity for the person?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. Did you feel sorry for the person?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much

11. Did you feel sad about the person’s behavior?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much

12. Did the person’s behavior make you feel alone after the conflict?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much

13. Did the person’s behavior depress you?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much

14. Did the person’s behavior make you feel shameful?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much

15. Did you feel embarrassed by the person’s behavior?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much

16. Did the person’s behavior make you feel guilty?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much

Continue on the next page

Appendix F: Demographics

Please provide us with some general information about yourself.

Age 

Gender: Male Female 

Which of the following best represents your ethnic background?

- Anglo-American (Non-Latino)
- Latino-American (specify)
- African American
- Other (please specify)
- Asian-American (specify):

Were you born in the United States? Yes No

If no, indicate the year you immigrated to the United States 

Are you bi-lingual? Yes: (language spoken)

No

Marital Status (Check the appropriate response)

- Single (never married)
- Divorced or Separated
- Widowed
- Married (how long?)

Name of your institution 

College major 

Current occupation 

What is your religious orientation/preference?

- Christian (Catholic, Protestant)
- Jewish
- Muslim
- None/ No Preference
- Buddhist
- Hindu
- Other (please specify)

Stop! You have completed the questionnaire. Thank you.